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Climate scientists face a serious public image problem because the next round of climate models
they are working on are destined to produce a wider rather than a smaller range of uncertainty. To
the public and policymakers, it will look as if the scientific understanding of climate change is
becoming less rather than more clear, particularly as there will be a deliberate attempt by lobbyists
and parts of the media to portray the science in this way. There is a need to communicate the
fundamental strengths and weaknesses of climate modelling as an essential tool to allow us to
understand the consequences of our actions and to develop appropriate policy. We need to
demonstrate that with greater knowledge comes greater uncertainty but also greater transparency
and confidence in our knowledge. New communications strategies that do not solely rely on the
‘weight of evidence’ argument but instead aim to win hearts and minds are required. New policy
approaches combining win–win solutions are required if issues of climate change mitigation and
adaptation are to be tackled.
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T he next Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC) major assessment of climatescience is due to be released in 2013, and will
include climate models containing a significant
increase in our understanding of complex climate
processes. However, these models will have a wider
rather than smaller range of scientific uncertainty. Sci-
entists need to face up to this, and develop a plan of
how to explain uncertainty to avoid climate deniers
suggesting that the science is fundamentally wrong.
Above all, the public and policymakers need be con-
vinced that climate models have reached their current
limit and must stop waiting for further certainty or
persuasion, but should start developing appropriate
mitigation and adaption policies around the world.
But for the public and policymakers to move
beyond questioning the underlying physics they need
to have a greater appreciation of why these numerical
models have reached a limit. First, models are not
reality. It may sound strange to have to state this but it
is a fundamental point which is regularly ignored.
Second, there are intrinsic problems with modelling
natural systems (Cartwright 1983). This is because it is
impossible to truly verify or validate the numerical
models as they are never closed systems and results
are never unique (Oreskes et al. 1994). This is particu-
lar true of climate models because despite being
based on fundamental physical equations they still
require many parameters that are incompletely known
(Oreskes et al. 2010).
One of these variables is the accumulation of
greenhouse gases and aerosols in the atmosphere by
the end of the century, which is an essential input to
the models. These projections are based on eco-
nomic models, which attempt to predict global fossil
fuel use over 100 years given extremely broad
assumptions about how integrated and green the
global economy will become (IPCC 2000; van
Vuuren et al. 2011). The original IPCC reports used
simplistic assumption of greenhouse gas emissions
over the next 100 years. From 2000 onwards the
climate models used the Special Report on Emission
Scenarios (SRES; IPCC 2000). The next generation of
climate model results to be published in the 2013
IPCC Science Report will use the new representative
concentration pathways (RCPs) which consider a
much wider variable input to the social-economic
models, including population, land use, energy
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intensity, energy use and regional differentiated
development. However the new RCPs mean that
comparison of the 2013 IPCC results will be difficult
with the IPCC 2001 and 2007 outputs, which used
the SRES. These scenarios are just the start of the
cascade of uncertainty shown in Figure 1.
In the most recent IPCC assessment, released in
2007, the greenhouse gas scenarios were then input
into about 20 general circulationmodels (GCMs). Each
of the models has their own independent design and
parameterisations of key processes. For example, how
to model the positive and negative feedbacks from
clouds. Clouds are one of the largest uncertainties in
climate models as they increase the global reflection of
solar radiation up to 30%, reducing the amount of
sunlight absorbed by the Earth But this cooling is offset
somewhat by the greenhouse effect of clouds, which
reduces the net loss of heat from the Earth. The inde-
pendence of each model is important, as some confi-
dence may be derived from multiple runs on different
models providing similar future climate predictions.
While the differences between the models can help us
to learn about their individual limitations and advan-
tages. Within the IPCC, due to political expediency,
each model and its output is assumed to be equally
valid. This is despite the fact that some are known to
perform better than others when tested against reality
provided by the historic and palaeoclimate records.
This difference will be exacerbated in the 2013 IPCC
assessment as some models have greater spatial reso-
lution while others do not. Moreover, as discussed by
Palmer (2012), we understand uncertainty within a
single model but the notion of quantifying uncertainty
from many models currently lacks any real theoretical
background or basis.
The outputs from these GCMs are then used to drive
more detailed regional climate models to project
more local environmental variations. Down-scaling is
a huge problem recognised in the modelling commu-
nity (IPCC 2007b). This is because precipitation is
spatially and temporally highly variable but essential
to model if human impacts are to be predicted
(Oreskes et al. 2010). Ultimately the cascade of uncer-
tainty leads to a huge range of potential future events
at a regional level that are in some cases contradic-
tory. For example, detailed hydrological modelling of
the Mekong River Basin using climate model input
from just a single GCM (the Met Office HadCM3) led
to projected future changes in annual river discharge
ranging from a decrease of 5.4% to an increase of
4.5% (Kingston et al. 2011). Changes in predicted
monthly discharge are even more dramatic, ranging
from -16% to +55%. Advising policymakers becomes
extremely hard when the uncertainties do not even
allow one to tell if the river catchment system in the
future will have more or less water. But there may be
key communication lessons that we could learn from
the way other scientists communicate risk, for
example, with earthquake risk the public and policy-
makers have become used to the idea of probability
when it comes to timing and magnitude.
The projected regional climate changes are then
used as a basis for so-called impact models that
attempt to estimate the effect on the quality of human
life (Barker 2008). The scale of impact of climate
change is, however, driven more by the relative resil-
ience of the society affected than the magnitude of
change. The most advanced of these socioeconomic
models determine the monetary costs arising both in
market and non-market sectors. But these models fail
to adequately account for many aspects of human
suffering possibly caused by climate change, as they
evaluate the impact of climate change on human
welfare purely in monetary terms (Stern 2007).
Whereas money can be lent, exchanged, traded or
even gain interest, an individual’s welfare and life
cannot. Moreover, despite continued arguments
between economists, future losses are discounted at a
fairly arbitrary rate (Stern 2007).
Above we have considered mean state changes
such as river discharge. The single biggest problem
with impact models, however, is their inability to
Figure 1 Estimations of climate change impact and societal
response based on models containing increasing
uncertainty. Solid lines are modelled outputs while white
dotted lines are inputs to the next layer of models
Source: Adapted and expanded from Hillerbrand and Ghil
(2008)
Commentary 265
The Geographical Journal Vol. 179 No. 3, pp. 264–271, 2013© 2013 The Author. The Geographical Journal © 2013 Royal Geographical Society
(with the Institute of British Geographers)
predict extreme events, though a recent IPCC report
tries hard to set new foundations for this sort of work
(IPCC 2012). This is because we know that humanity
can live, survive and even flourish in extreme climates
from the Arctic to the Sahara, but problems arise when
the predictable extremes of local climate are
exceeded. For example, heat waves, storms, droughts
and floods in one region may be considered fairly
normal weather in another. This is because each
society has a ‘climatic’ coping range, which in effect,
is a range of weather that it has evolved historically to
deal with. Figure 2 shows the theoretical effect of
combining the coping range with climate change. In
our present climate, the coping range encompasses
nearly all the variation in weather with maybe only
one or two significant events causing disruption per
year. As the climate moves gently to its new average,
if the coping range stays the same then many more
extreme events occur. For example, in the historically
mild climate of northern Europe, homes are built with
central heating but not air-conditioning. As summer
temperatures increase and heat waves like 2003
become common, then the coping range of our homes
will be exceeded (Maslin 2009). Over 35 000 older
people died during the 2003 heat wave due to the
inability to deal with high night-time temperatures.
This does not occur in other much hotter developed
countries because of the extensive availability of air-
conditioning.
Climate change science is also rapidly moving
forward and is now attempting to attribute the contri-
bution of anthropogenic climate change to extreme
weather events. A few years ago this would be
unheard of and the standard communication line was
that scientists could not attribute individual weather
events to climate change but the event in question
may be consistent with what is expected to happen in
the future. However, with increased computer power
it is possible to run regional climate scenarios with
and without the contribution of global warming and
so assess the potential impact on the occurrence of
extreme weather events. A discernable contribution of
climate change was found for UK Floods in 2000 (Pall
et al. 2011), the Russian heat wave of 2010 (Otto et al.
2012), and the Texan and East African droughts of
2011 (Peterson et al. 2012), while none was found for
the floods in Thailand in 2011 (Peterson et al. 2012).
However, this science is still in its infancy and some-
times throws up contradictory studies due to what we
exactly mean by anthropogenic climate change con-
tribution. This is shown by two papers related to the
Russian heat wave of 2010. Dole et al. (2011) con-
cluded that climate change did not contribute to the
event while Rahmstorf and Coumou (2011) con-
cluded that it had. The apparent mismatch was
because the two papers asked different questions
(Otto et al. 2012). Dole et al. (2011) showed that
climate change had had little or no effect on the
magnitude of the Russian heat wave, while Rahmstorf
and Coumou (2011) showed that climate change had
increased the frequency at which these events could
occur. This demonstrates the importance of scientists
and policymakers asking the right questions.
Despite potential limitations with climate models
there is still a wide range of views about how useful
they are in helping us to understand the future and
informing policy. A central debate has emerged
between scientists who take the optimistic view sug-
gesting we can model future climate tipping points
(Lenton 2011) and those who say we cannot even get
the past correct (Valdes 2011). Lenton (2011) tackles
potential climate tipping points such as the irrevers-
ible melting of the Greenland ice sheet, dieback of the
Amazon rainforest and the shift of the West African
monsoon. He argues that with more research it will be
possible to use models to provide an early warning
system as we approach climatic tipping points. Lenton
(2011) uses inherent assumptions about bifurcations
within critical parts of the climate system and the
ability to use the past climate records as a test for
Figure 2 Climate change, society’s weather coping range, and extreme events
Source: Adapted from Maslin (2009)
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these tipping points. In contrast, Valdes (2011) argues
that the current IPCC models cannot simulate abrupt
climate change. When tested against four major past
climate changes, for two of them, the models did not
even get the basic climate prior to the shift correct,
and for the other two, climate forcing up to 10 times
greater than natural were required to get the abrupt
shift. His conclusion was that climate models are too
stable and are built not to fail. These are two very
different views by respected scientists, but it is the
former view that is the most worrying and seems to
imply we have forgotten all the lessons learnt about
the limits of knowledge from chaos and complexity
theory.
This discussion does not mean that climate models
are useless. The present models are clearly able to
reproduce natural climate variability over the past 150
years. They have provided an essential test of the
theoretical link between CO2 and global tempera-
tures, supporting the extensive experimental and pal-
aeoclimate work. They provide an insight into the
possible climate of the future and clear choices about
what future we would like to have. This vision of the
future has been incredibly stable. For example, the
predicted global temperature rise resulting from a
doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere has not changed
much in over 20 years (Figure 3 and Table 1; Knutti
and Hegerl 2008). Yet when Schmittner et al. (2011)
published a slightly lower value, the BBC declared
‘Climate sensitive was overestimated’ despite signifi-
cant criticisms of the study and the fact it still fell
within the range of all the IPCC reports. The uncer-
tainties around future projections are because of the
complexity of positive and negative feedback within
the climate system, and represent our ability to under-
stand each process. The consistency of predictions
over decades leads to an increase in our confidence
because, despite the uncertainty, the basic projections
have not changed (Figure 3). It is these key points that
need to be emphasized and clearly communicated
when the next IPCC assessment is published.
The climate models, or as some groups are now
referring to them, ‘climate simulators’ in the IPCC fifth
assessment will include some significant improve-
ments. Many of the models contain better representa-
tion of atmospheric chemistry, aerosol processes and
the carbon cycle, including land vegetation feed-
backs, while the cascade of uncertainties inherent to
modelling work will remain much the same. Many of
the models will have a small increase in spatial reso-
lution. The models will also focus on decadal fore-
casts to help us understand the internal variability of
the climate (Cane 2011). There will also be separate
chapters dealing with near-term climate up to 2050
Figure 3 Collation of equilibrium climate sensitivity estimates, which represent the equilibrium global temperature
reached with a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide (see Table 1). Red shows estimates using just equations; blue
shows when climate models have been used and how many; and green shows when palaeoclimate records have been
used to provide the estimate. Circles are the best estimate and triangles represent the full published potential range
Source: Adapted from Maslin and Austin (2012)
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and climate post 2100. There is also very little change
in equilibrium climate sensitivity to doubling of
atmospheric CO2. The uncertainties around future
projections may increase by up to 20%, but this is
because of our greater understanding of the processes
and our ability to quantify that knowledge. Rowlands
et al. (2012) recently explored the amount of uncer-
tainty inherent in complex models by running one
specific model through nearly 10 000 simulations (as
opposed to the usual handful of runs that can usually
be managed). While his average results matched well
with previous IPCC projections, Rowlands found that
more extreme results, including warming of up to 4°C
by 2050, were just as likely. That uncertainty was
masked in the IPCC fourth assessment by the fact that
complex models are not usually put through their
paces so thoroughly; as computing power becomes
more accessible, that ‘hidden’ uncertainty will
become more obvious.
IPCC needs to be aware of the effects of our greater
understanding of uncertainties. It needs to design a
communication strategy that allows a clear demonstra-
tion of the science (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007) and for
once be prepared for the inevitable backlash from
those who wish to misunderstand the science. IPCC
needs to appreciate the scale and funding these groups
and individuals represent. For example, a quick look at
the top 10 ‘global warming’ books on amazon.co.uk
(accessed 2 September 2012) showed that 6 out of the
top 10 were by climate change deniers. Interestingly,
only 2 out of the top 10 books using ‘climate change’ in
the title were written by climate change deniers. What
is clear is that one part-time ‘media person’ was not
enough to deal with the so-called ‘climate-gate’ or
‘Himalayan-gate’ media events.The IPCC now has two
full-time media experts but compare this to Tesco UK,
which has a whole ‘government department’ that is
aimed at lobbying just the UK government. The IPCC
has also been offered free support by many of the
world’s leading PR/advertising/campaign companies
but has turned much of it down. This is a great shame
given the communications challenge of climate
change and the new IPCC 2013 Science Report. The
IPCC must stop approaching the communication chal-
lenge from a science perspective as it is clear that
‘scientific weight of evidence’ is not the issue; if it were
then the battle would have been over long ago. Rather
it is about vestige interests both politics and business
that do not want to have to deal with the fact that our
pollution is changing the climate and we should do
something about it. At a more worrying level, it is also
about how science is now seen and understood in the
USA and the UK. Over the past 25 years scientific
issues have become akin to a belief system with ques-
tions like ‘do you believe in evolution’ or ‘do you
believe in climate change’ becoming the norm.
Climate change communication is much more about
good PR that wins hearts and minds. One novel
approach could be to define uncertainty in terms of
when the planet will hit a certain temperature. This
approach has recently been used by Joshi et al. (2011),
who showed that the political expedient 2°C limit will
Table 1 Review of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) estimates, which represent the equilibrium global temperature
reached with a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide
Year Source ECS (°C) Range (°C) Models used
1896 Arrhenius No figure given 4.95–6.05 Equations
1938 Callendar 2.0 Not given Equations
1956 Plass 3.6 Not given Equations
1967 Manabe and Weatherald 2.3 Not given 1
1975 Manabe and Weatherald 2.93 Not given 1
1979 Charney et al. 3.0 1.5 4
1979 Ramanthan et al. 3.29 – this is from the
annual model
No range is given 1
1990 Lorius et al. Range only 3.0–4.0 1
1990 IPCC first assessment report 2.5 1.5–4.5 11
1995 IPCC second assessment report 3.8  0.78 1.9–5.2 17
2001 IPCC third assessment report 3.5  0.92 2.1–5.1 15
2005 Frame et al. 2.4 1.4–4.1
2006 Forster and Gregory 1–4.1 Equations
2007 Royer et al. 1.6–5.5 Palaeo-data
2007a IPCC fourth assessment report 3.26  0.69 2.1–4.4 18
2010 Köhler et al. 2.3 1.3–5.2 Palaeo-data
2011 Schmittner et al. 2.3 1.7–2.6 1 model with palaeo-
data constraints
Note that the Schmittner et al. (2011) estimate is thought to be too low as they assume the Last Glacial Maximum was globally
only 3.5°C cooler not 5.8 1.4°C as found by others (e.g. Schnieder Von Deimling et al. 2006)
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be reached between 2040 and 2100 depending on our
emissions pathway and which model is used. This
‘when’ not ‘if’ approach is a very powerful when
illustrating the impacts of future climate change.
In the face of scientific uncertainty, various philoso-
phies for decisionmaking have arisen. Each has flaws.
The precautionary principle states that action should
be taken against worst-case scenarios, ‘just in case’.
This is problematic as it does not take into account
that acting, as well as not acting, may yield unaccept-
able consequences. Cost–benefit analyses attempt to
take this into account by totalling the sum impacts of
different actions or non-actions. But there are serious
problems in accounting for all possible costs, and
giving them a numerical value. Debates arise about
whether the cost to our offspring should count for less
than the costs to today’s generation (known as ‘dis-
counting the future’), and about the (perhaps variable)
value of human life. Expected utility theory, a tool that
balances risk against reward using probabilistic math-
ematical functions, requires assumptions about the
likely impacts on human welfare and assumes a moral
focus on the majority rather than the individual (Hill-
erbrand and Ghil 2008).
However, uncertainty rarely stops politicians
making decisions, and in the case of climate change,
public opinion and scientific uncertainty seem to be
used as excuses for inaction. For example, politicians
used to say ‘we need to wait until scientists prove that
mankind is causing climate change’. That hurdle has
passed; now they have moved on to ‘we need to wait
until scientists can tell us exactly what will happen,
and the costs of inaction’, or ‘we need to wait for
public opinion to be behind action’. As I hope I have
demonstrated above, the former will never occur
because the modelling can never provide that level of
certainty. The latter is a slight of hand as in no other
area do politicians assume the need for public
support; for example, from wars to bank bailouts, from
taxation to healthcare reforms.
Greater knowledge and better models will always
be desirable but they are not the panacea to cure
political and public reticence to act on climate
change. So despite the increased defined uncertainty
within climate models, the increased confidence and
huge weight of scientific evidence are good enough to
tell us what we fundamentally need to know.We need
governments to just go ahead and take action, which
is exactly what has occurred in the UK, the EU and
Mexico with climate change legislation. But, as sci-
entists, we must remember that policymakers have to
put climate change in the context of the meta-
narratives of the twenty-first century, which include
global economic stability, alleviating global poverty
and global security (e.g. Stern 2007; Adger 2006;
Barnett and Adger 2007). This is because, despite the
seriousness of climate change and the worry of what
might happen in 10, 20 or 50 years time, it seems
rather naïve when 8 million children die needlessly
each year, 800 million people go to bed hungry each
night and 1000 million people still do not have
regular access to clean safe drinking water (Kovats
et al. 2005; Costello et al. 2009).
Despite the actions of individual countries and
regions, there is still a need for a legally binding
international agreement. Once these are forthcoming
there would still need to be sophisticated political
solutions at all levels; from the binding international
agreement to regional, national and local policies
(Maslin and Scott 2011). This multi-level governance
is essential as it provides redundancy in the system
and acts as a regulatory safety net if higher-level poli-
Figure 4 Comic from the United States news publication USA Today, 2009
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cies break down or are gamed. For example, the UN
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) gives credits
for projects involving the capture of industrial gases
(hydrofluorocarbons or HFCs) and has regrettably
been easy to game. The regulation has created a per-
verse incentive for companies to produce more
HCFC-22, a refrigerant and powerful greenhouse gas
being phased out under the Montreal Protocol, in
return for windfall profits for capturing the HFC-23
by-product from its production. The European Com-
mission concluded in 2011 that production of
HCFC-22 could be higher today than it would have
been in the absence of CDM activity.
Action on climate change, therefore, should always
contain an element of win–win. For example, support-
ing a huge increase in renewable energy not only
reduces emissions but helps to provide energy secu-
rity by reducing the reliance on imported oil, coal and
gas (Bradshaw 2010). Reduced deforestation and
reforestation should not only draw down CO2 from
the atmosphere but help to retain biodiversity, stabi-
lise soils and provide livelihoods for local people via
carbon credits. Measures that reduce car use will
increase walking and cycling, which in turn reduce
obesity and heart attacks (Haines et al. 2009). No one
can object to creating a better world, even if we are
extremely lucky and the scale of climate change is on
the low end of all projections. This point was beauti-
fully illustrated by a cartoon published in USA Today
in 2009 (see Figure 4).
Predicting the future is extremely hard. Climate
scientists’ projections of the future and their associ-
ated uncertainties are an essential tool to allow us to
understand the consequences of our actions. Climate
scientists need to communicate the fundamental
strengths of the science and why estimations of
uncertainties demonstrate the transparency of our
knowledge. We do not need to demand impossible
levels of certainty from the models to envisage a
better safer future.
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